California Case Law — Analogous Cases & Outcomes
For: Cuellar, case 2026-00034514 / booking 20.03301058 — VC 23152(a) & (b), SBPD, SBSUP
Charges: two misdemeanors, 23152(a) and 23152(b). Blood 0.226 ±0.09, drawn 3/26/26, produced in discovery 10/13/26.
DMV APS continued hearing 11/18/26 (H.O. Salazar).
Read the outcome column honestly — several go against the defendant. Those define what you must prove.
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★★★ SECTION 0 — THE HEAD-INJURY LINE (NEW, AND NOW THE LEAD)
New facts supplied by client: concussion from the collision; officer advised him not to seek medical attention; phlebotomist repeatedly asked if he was okay / if he was wearing a seatbelt; phlebotomist insisted he take Tylenol, gave ~8 packets (≈16 tablets); severe headache began ~4 hours later in the jail cell.
Hughey v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 752 — ★ THE ON-POINT CASE. DEFENDANT WON.
Facts — a near-mirror:
- Motorcycle accident, unhelmeted, head trauma; officer dispatched to accident scene
- Officer observed: strong odour of alcohol, staggering, bloodshot and watery eyes, slow, slurred speech, poor tracking / lateral nystagmus
- "In and out" (responsive → irrational) and "up and down" (calm → belligerent); uncooperative, refused medical care
- "The officer abandoned his decision to take Hughey to the hospital" and took him to a jail cell instead
- Amnesia across the whole event; a witness said he was unconscious for minutes
Outcome: Trial court granted writ, DMV ordered to SET ASIDE the suspension — and the Court of Appeal AFFIRMED.
Holding: a driver may defend an implied-consent hearing by proving lack of capacity to refuse, and where head trauma caused the incapacity, "It was unlikely that alcohol caused his behavior." Under then-VC 23157(a)(5), one incapable of refusal is deemed not to have withdrawn consent.
Why this is your case:
| Hughey | You |
|---|
| Head trauma in collision | Concussion in collision |
| Bloodshot/watery eyes, slow slurred speech | Same symptoms charted |
| Officer abandoned hospital plan → jail | Officer advised against medical attention → jail |
| Victim "refused medical care" | You were steered away from it |
| Neurologist testified head injury explained behaviour | Your hospital records + delayed headache |
| WON — suspension set aside | — |
Also quoted in Hughey (p.755): "Serious injury to the head, even though not causing sustained unconsciousness, may nevertheless render the injured person incapable of refusal." And: officers should "appreciate the circumstances indicative of possible head injuries and, in acting to secure medical attention for the accident victim, consult with and benefit from the counsel of medical professionals."
★ THE FOUR-HOUR DELAYED HEADACHE IS YOUR BEST SINGLE FACT
The worst headache of his life, 4 hours after the collision, in a jail cell, severe enough to consume all 16 tablets.
- CDC: concussion symptoms "may not appear for hours or days after the injury." Mayo Clinic: symptom onset "right away or in the hours and days after."
- "A headache that gets worse over time" is a listed seek-emergency-care danger sign.
- Because onset was delayed and escalating, it is medical proof the concussion was already present at the scene — retroactively validating the very symptoms Moya read as intoxication. Moya's observations and the concussion are the same event.
▲ THE TYLENOL — what it does and does NOT do
Be honest: acetaminophen does not meaningfully change a BAC reading. It is not an alcohol-containing medicine. And the timeline kills any direct effect anyway — blood was drawn at the scene, the Tylenol was taken ~4 hours later in jail. So the 0.226 was fixed before a single tablet.
So why it matters — two reasons:
1. The phlebotomist's independent clinical concern. A trained phlebotomist (V. Vasquez, CPT #559) repeatedly asked if he was okay, asked about the seatbelt, and had to insist on analgesia. She was observing something not explained by alcohol. That is independent medical corroboration, from the state's own witness, that this was a trauma presentation.
2. The delayed headache is documented by the fact he took all 16 tablets and got relief. Dosing ~16 tablets (≈5,200 mg if regular strength, ≈8,000 mg if extra strength) over 4 hours is a substantial analgesic response — you don't take 16 tablets for a hangover.
And one caution: 16 tablets in 4 hours is at or above the usual daily ceiling for acetaminophen (4,000 mg/day guidance). Because a single dose can push liver enzymes (ALT) up, if the blood is ever re-tested or a second draw exists, ALT/AST elevation could be misread. Worth flagging to counsel — but it did not alter the BAC.
Other supporting head-trauma / misdiagnosis cases
| Case | Facts | Outcome | Use |
|---|
| People v. Klaus (2016) F068339 (unpub.) | Collision; defence expert argued the driver was a poor FST candidate because he had just been in a vehicle accident; driver had a rare nystagmus condition; underfilled tube + no refrigeration docs | Jury ACQUITTED on both BAC counts | Couples the accident/head-trauma FST attack to the Title 17 blood attack — the same pairing you have |
| Meza (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 594 | Collision; officer noted bloodshot watery eyes "which she knew could be a symptom of alcohol consumption, or potentially a head injury" | Blood draw 4A-violative but harmless | Shows a real officer recognising the differential |
| D'Braunstein v. CHP (9th Cir. 2025) 22-55237 | Stroke misread as intoxication; officer failed to summon medical care; 3-hour delay → irreversible brain damage | Plaintiff won — summary judgment on immunity reversed | Modern authority that failure to summon care is actionable |
| Harb v. City of Bakersfield (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 606 | Stroke; officer assumed intoxication from vomiting/slurred speech/disorientation; ambulance left without patient | Plaintiffs won — reversed for retrial | Assumption-of-intoxication over trauma |
| Plunkett v. Alexis (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 370 | Accident, broken nose/fractured sternum, claimed pain prevented comprehension | Defendant lost — conscious throughout | The limit: pain alone, while conscious, may not excuse |
⚑ THE DMV'S OWN MANUAL CONCEDES YOUR POINT
DMV Hearing Officer Manual, § 12.073 — "Insufficient Evidence to Support the Intoxication Sub-Issue":
> "Illness or injury, such as diabetic hypoglycemia or a head injury, may cause symptoms similar to intoxication. Consider whether the officer knew or should have known of the medical condition(s)."
And § 12.072 lists non-alcohol causes for their own symptom list: "Bloodshot/watery eyes can be due to crying, contact lenses, allergies, or other eye irritations… Gait or balance problems could be due to musculoskeletal problems, injuries… Drowsiness could be due to fatigue or lack of sleep."
Moya knew. A collision, page 1 marked "injured: YES", and a witness asking "is he normally this slow?" — then he checked "no injuries" on the booking app and skipped the medical exam.
⚑ TITLE 15 § 1207 — the booking screening was botched
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 1207 (Medical Receiving Screening) requires a screening of every arrestee at intake, covering medical problems, with documented disposition. Your booking app records "Any injuries or illnesses? NO" and "Medical Examination Prior to Booking? NO" — flatly contradicting page 1 of the DUI report ("Are you injured? YES") by the same officer. That is a documented breach of a mandatory screening, not a clerical slip.
Effect on the case: the head-injury line is now CO-EQUAL with suppression
Hughey gives a published win on essentially your facts, and it wins at the DMV — your 18 November forum — on the incapacity theory, which does not require beating the BAC number at all. Combine with § 12.073 and the Title 15 breach and this becomes arguable as a standalone set-aside.
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A. THE BLOOD WAS TAKEN WITHOUT A WARRANT — still your strongest federal issue
This is the most valuable line of attack and it is independent of BAC, of Title 17, and of the collision. Four cases, and the arc runs in your favour on timing.
| Case | Facts | Outcome | Bearing on you |
|---|
| Missouri v. McNeely (2013) 569 U.S. 141 | Forced blood draw, no warrant, no consent | Defendant won. No per-se exigency; must justify case-by-case | Killed the rule that dissipating alcohol = automatic warrantless-draw authority. Prosecution must now prove a warrant or an exception. |
| People v. Arredondo (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186 | Unconscious driver, warrantless hospital draw, BAC 0.08 | Defendant won on the law, LOST on the remedy. Held: implied-consent statute alone cannot justify a warrantless draw — but officer's reliance on it was "good faith," so evidence stayed in | Court expressly refused to let imputed consent excuse the warrant: "If imputed consent is to be held sufficient to sustain a warrantless search, the holding will have to come from a court other than this one." |
| People v. Harris (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671 | Pre-McNeely draw | Defendant lost (affirmed) — actual consent found, plus good faith | Good-faith saved it because the draw predated McNeely. |
| People v. Ling (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1 | Warrantless draw after DUI arrest; driver said nothing, didn't resist | Defendant WON. Suppression granted, reversed on appeal | Your best case. Silence + no resistance = submission to authority, NOT consent. Officer saying "you have to submit" destroys a consent theory. |
⚑ THE TIMING POINT THAT IS WORTH REAL MONEY TO YOU
The good-faith exception that beat Arredondo and Harris does not apply to you. Their draws happened in 2013 and 2015, on the wrong side of McNeely. *Your draw was 26 March 2026 — thirteen years after McNeely.* By then, warrantless DUI blood draws were black-letter settled law. So the officer cannot say he was reasonably ignorant.
If SBPD did not get a warrant, and if your consent was not express and knowing (Ling: mere non-resistance isn't consent), the blood result is suppressible outright. And if the blood goes, the 0.226 goes with it, and 23152(b) collapses. That is a dismissal, not a reduction.
Critical unknown: was there a warrant? Did Moya read you an implied-consent admonition, and did you actually say "yes"?
- No warrant + no express consent → strong motion under Ling.
- Warrant → this line closes, and you fight on Title 17 instead.
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B. TITLE 17 — the chain-of-custody / preservation attack
| Case | Holding | Bearing |
|---|
| People v. Adams (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559 | Regulatory noncompliance goes to weight, not admissibility. Three foundations needed: working apparatus, properly administered test, competent operator | The blood result will still come in. Title 17 is how you cripple it, not exclude it. |
| People v. Williams (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408 | Reaffirmed Adams; Title 17 applies to blood/breath alcohol concentration tests | Confirms the regulations you'll cite are in scope. |
| Gerwig v. Gordon (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 59 | ⚠️ LIMIT. Proved an actual Title 17 violation (unsupervised phlebotomist, unapproved manual) — and still LOST. Holding: "showing any violation of title 17 is not sufficient in and of itself." Licensee must show the violation gives rise to a reasonable inference the test results are unreliable | This is the case the DMV will throw at you. You cannot just tick off violations — you must bridge each one to a wrong number. |
| People v. Klaus (2016) F068339 (unpub.) | Collision. Blood tube under-filled → risk of microbial contamination generating additional alcohol; no documentation the sample was refrigerated between draw and analysis. Toxicologist: "could not give any reliability to the blood results." | Your blueprint, and the outcome is genuinely instructive. Jury ACQUITTED on 23152(b) and on 23153(b) — the BAC counts — convicting only of 23153(a), the generic count. The blood attack did destroy the per-se charge. Note also: defence expert faulted the FSTs because the man had just been in a vehicle accident. |
How to use Klaus against Gerwig
Klaus is exactly the bridge Gerwig demands. Underfilled tube and undocumented refrigeration are not clerical — they are mechanisms that manufacture alcohol. Fermentation in the tube inflates the number. That is a direct nexus to reliability, which is what Gerwig requires. Argue the nexus explicitly; don't just list the defects.
Seven months from draw (3/26) to disclosure (10/13) is itself the refrigeration question. Demand storage logs.
Your auditors to run:
- Specimen kit #373451 — tube fill volume, preservative/anticoagulant (sodium fluoride + potassium oxalate), expiration
- Chain of custody: every signature and date between 3/26 and the lab
- Receipt date at the lab and testing date — the gap between them
- Storage temperature log for the whole period
- Swab type used at the draw site — an alcohol-based swab contaminates (Gerwig lists § 1219.1(b),(d)(1) as "patently connected to the test's reliability")
- V. Vasquez CPT #559 — current certification, and whether supervision was available (Gerwig's phlebotomist was functionally unsupervised)
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C. ▲ THE 0.226 AND "RISING BAC" — where you are weakest
| Case | Facts | Outcome | Bearing |
|---|
| Coffey v. Shiomoto (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1288 | Breath 0.08, then 0.09, then blood 0.095 — a textbook rising-BAC pattern. Expert testified BAC was below 0.08 while driving | Defendant LOST. Suspension upheld. | Expert evidence did rebut the 3-hour presumption — but the DMV won anyway because erratic driving + failed FSTs + objective symptoms were substantial circumstantial evidence of BAC at the time of driving. |
| People v. Warlick (2008) 162 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1 | Breath 0.07; prosecution wanted retrograde extrapolation to prove 0.08+ | Prosecution won — extrapolation admissible. "Nothing … prevents the prosecution from trying to prove its case without the benefit of the statutory presumption." | Retrograde extrapolation cuts both ways — expect the state to use it. |
| Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257 | Constitutional challenge to 23152(b) | Prosecution position upheld — "[c]ircumstantial evidence will generally be necessary" | Settles that they need not have a BAC reading at the moment of driving. |
| People v. Vangelder (2013) 58 Cal.4th 1 | Breath, marginal reading; defence expert on machine reliability excluded | Defendant won on appeal — exclusion was prejudicial; "[e]ven a small error could possibly turn a marginally legal reading into an illegal reading." | Margin-of-error evidence is admissible and can be outcome-determinative — but only where the reading is marginal. |
| People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183 | Partition-ratio variability | Partition challenge inadmissible for 23152(b) per se, admissible for 23152(a) generic | Blood test, not breath — partition ratio matters less to you, but the (a)/(b) split is worth knowing. |
The hard truth on your numbers
Your earlier strategy doc put "Rising BAC" as vector_3. It is your weakest vector, and Coffey is why:
- 0.226 is not marginal. Vangelder works for a 0.08. You need to surrender 0.146 — nearly double the limit — to reach a 0.08 at the wheel. With a collision, transport and booking (60–120 min), absorption is essentially complete. Rising BAC has almost no headroom.
- And you have the worst companion facts. Coffey expressly beat rising BAC with erratic driving + FST failures + objective symptoms. You had a collision. Driving-badly evidence is baked into your facts.
- ±0.09 does not rescue it either. Even the low end, 0.136, clears 0.08 comfortably. So uncertainty cannot acquit.
Where ±0.09 IS worth fighting: the enhancements, not the charge.
Range on face value ≈ 0.136–0.316. The state must then struggle to prove ≥0.20 (steeper program, higher fines). Pushing the number below 0.20 knocks out the enhancement without touching the base count. Confirm the actual figure first: expanded vs standard uncertainty, and k=1 or k=2.
Reframe accordingly
Rising BAC is a timeline argument, not a sobriety argument. Its real work is the 20:29 vs 20:50 arrest-time contradiction — the same officer's two forms disagree on when you were arrested, which is precisely the interval that matters for back-extrapolation. Use it to make either number unreliable.
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D. ▲ THE BLANK DS-367 — real, but contested at DMV
| Case | Holding | Bearing |
|---|
| MacDonald v. Gutierrez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 150 | Section 13380 requires a sworn report with "all information relevant" — but no statutory penalty for failing to fill it out properly. Once a sworn report is filed, "technical omissions" may be corrected by an unsworn report by the same officer. Only warns the sworn report "cannot be wholly devoid of relevant information." | This is the DMV's answer to your blank narrative. Your own source materials overstate the point: a blank page does not automatically set aside the suspension. |
| Solovij v. Gourley (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1229 | Overruled by MacDonald — had held inadequate sworn report → unsworn report inadmissible | Cited by the prosecution; be ready for it. |
| Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448 | Unsworn statement by a nonarresting officer admissible | Background. |
| People v. Ward (1985) | Complaint dismissed for no probable cause for the stop | Dismissal remedy exists where the stop itself is unlawful — separate from the DS-367. |
Straight read: MacDonald limits the blank-DS-367 win. If only page 7 is blank while the rest carries facts, the DMV cures it with Moya's unsworn report. Your argument is stronger if the narrative is wholly devoid (MacDonald's exact phrase) — or if there is no other evidence of probable cause to fall back on, forcing the case into a Ling-style suppression rather than a paperwork win.
So: don't lead with the blank form. Lead with the warrant/consent issue, and use the blank DS-367 as corroboration of carelessness.
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E. Case law on your facts — the good ones
| Case | Detail mirroring yours | Why it helps |
|---|
| People v. Klaus (2016) | Vehicle accident; defence argued the driver was a poor FST candidate because he had just been in a collision | Directly supports your concussion defence — and Klaus's expert coupled that with an underfilled-tube attack. Klaus's jury acquitted on both BAC counts. |
| Klaus, expert Valentine | Driver had a rare nystagmus condition | Yours is a documented Restriction B (corrective lenses). Different defect, same shape: a physiological/equipment reason the eye and balance tests are invalid. |
| People v. Klaus, Arvizu (QA consultant) | Attacked the instrument set-up and storage | Confirms you can attack method and storage, not just paperwork. |
| Arredondo (fact pattern) | Collision, flip; BAC 0.08 | Shows what a collision + injured driver DUI actually looks like litigated — and that the good-faith crutch is now gone. |
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What the record has to answer before this can be ranked properly
1. Was a warrant obtained? (Decides whether section A is live at all.)
2. Was an implied-consent admonition read, and did you expressly agree? (Ling turns on exactly this.)
3. Is the DS-367 narrative wholly blank, or is page 7 blank with facts elsewhere? (MacDonald turns on exactly this.)
4. Is the ±0.09 expanded or standard; k=1 or k=2? (Decides whether the enhancement attack is real.)
5. Was the blood recollected/re-run, or is there one 3/26 draw tested once?
6. Did the collision cause actual injury to you — and is it charted? (Feeds Klaus and the denial-of-medical-eval contradiction.)
⚙️ THE LICENCE-SURVIVAL LAYER (from page 2 of the case file — "contingency")
The file's own contingency reads: "Prepare SR-22 and IID logistics. Ensure Euybike F6B is fully operational." That is correct and under-weighted. SR-22 and IID generally sit outside the MetLife plan (the plan excludes "filing fees, costs and fines"), so these are cash items to price now.
★ A COLLISION + INJURY PUTS HIM ON THE DMV "INJURY" TRACK
DMV publishes separate first-offender schedules — one for injury, one for non-injury — and the injury schedule mandates an Ignition Interlock Device:
> "Effective January 1, 2019, the Statewide Ignition Interlock Device (IID) Pilot Program requires first-time DUI offenders convicted of a DUI involving alcohol … that resulted in injury to install an IID for a specified time in the vehicle they operate." (DMV DL 1046 B, DUI First Offenders — Alcohol Involved — Injury)
His file records a traffic collision and page 1 of the DUI report marked "injured: YES." Note the charges were filed as misdemeanour 23152(a)/(b), not felony 23153 — so verify which track DMV has actually applied, because it changes the suspension length (4 months on the injury schedule) and triggers the IID mandate. Confirm the classification on the notice.
Hard deadlines (verify exact dates on the notice)
- 10 days from receipt of the suspension order to request the APS hearing — likely already met, since a hearing exists.
- 30 days from the suspension/revocation notice mail date to file an IID exemption (form DL 4062) if he qualifies. "Exemptions will not be granted for requests postmarked after 30 days."
- ⚠️ Owning a dead or PNO vehicle voids the exemption — "you do not qualify for an exemption if you own a car(s) that does not run or has an approved planned non-operation (PNO)." The 2005 Silverado was "towed by owner" — check its status if the IID exemption is the plan.
If he loses on 18 November — the recovery path (know it in advance)
- Restricted licence via the IID route is available immediately — no need to serve the 30 days first (the 30-day wait applies only to the employment/treatment-program restriction).
- Requires: proof of DUI program enrolment, SR-22, DL 920 IID installation verification, and a $125 APS fee.
- Installers must hold a valid BAR licence. Get quotes now.
- IID credit: any installation during the APS period gives credit toward the mandatory IID period imposed on conviction — so installing early is not wasted time.
- IID restriction gives unlimited driving (any time, anywhere) provided the vehicle has the device — strictly better than the employment-only restriction.
- Exemptions exist for: no vehicle owned/accessible, out-of-state residency, or a medical condition preventing sufficient breath to activate the IID.
- If a CDL is held: must downgrade to non-commercial to take any restriction.
- Conviction-side suspension may run concurrently with the APS suspension.
Action this week
1. Photograph/scan the suspension notice → confirm injury vs non-injury schedule and the exact 10/30-day dates.
2. Decide the IID plan before the hearing, not after — early install earns credit.
3. Get an SR-22 quote from his insurer (it is a filing, not a policy; cost is usually modest but ongoing).
4. Verify the Silverado's registration/PNO status if an IID exemption is being considered.
5. Price 2–3 BAR-licensed IID installers.
6. Keep the Euybike F6B serviced — it is the bridge while suspended.
7. Note MetLife's plan excludes appeals — a DMV writ (CCP § 1094.5) and any criminal appeal are out of pocket. Factor that in before choosing the appeal route.
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Net effect on strategy, ranked by legal leverage
1. *★ HEAD-INJURY / INCAPACITY LINE — Hughey v. DMV (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 752. A published win on near-identical facts (collision + head trauma + bloodshot/slurred + officer chose jail over hospital), won at the DMV*, on a theory that needs no attack on the BAC number. Backed by the DMV's own manual § 12.073 and a Title 15 § 1207 screening breach. This is now the lead at the 18 November hearing.
2. *Warrant / consent suppression (McNeely → Arredondo → Ling), pressing that the good-faith crutch is unavailable to a 2026 stop.* Highest upside in the criminal court: kills the whole blood case.
3. *Title 17 reliability attack, framed as a Gerwig nexus: underfilled tube + fermentation + seven months unrefrigerated, à la Klaus*. Kills the per-se count if it works.
4. *Enhancement strike via margin of error (Vangelder).* Realistic, concrete, preserves the base count.
5. *Blank DS-367 / probable cause (MacDonald, and Ward for dismissal).* Contested — supporting, not leading.
6. *Retrograde extrapolation / arrest-time contradiction (Coffey, Warlick, Meza).* Weakest on its own; run it through the 20:29-vs-20:50 conflict.
7. Restriction B FST invalidity + Tylenol / phlebotomist concern. Corroboration, not a standalone.
Verbatim lines for the attorney
- "The officer advised him not to seek medical attention after a collision, then booked him. Hughey v. DMV is nearly this fact pattern and the suspension was set aside — is that our primary theory at the APS hearing?"
- "Under Hughey, head trauma making a driver incapable of refusal means consent was not withdrawn. Does the implied-consent admonition here even validly apply?"
- "The DMV's own Hearing Officer Manual § 12.073 says head injury may cause intoxication symptoms and to consider whether the officer knew or should have known. Page 1 says injured YES; page 5 says no injuries and no medical exam."
- "Title 15 § 1207 required an intake medical screening. Was one done, and does the contradiction breach it?"
- "The phlebotomist asked repeatedly if he was okay and about his seatbelt, and insisted on Tylenol. That's the state's own witness flagging trauma. Subpoena her."
- "Worst headache of his life, four hours post-collision, in the cell — he took all sixteen tablets. That's delayed-onset concussion per CDC and Mayo. Get the medical records."
- "Was a warrant obtained for the March 26 blood draw, and does the DS-367 show an implied-consent admonition with an express election?"
- "Under Arredondo the implied-consent statute alone cannot justify a warrantless draw. Good faith saved Arredondo because his draw predated McNeely — this one is 2026."
- "Under Gerwig a Title 17 violation alone isn't enough — there must be a nexus. Is the underfilled tube and absent refrigeration documentation enough per Klaus?"
- "Demand the storage temperature log, and specimen kit #373451's fill volume and preservative record — draw 3/26, disclosed 10/13."
- "If he ever had an emergency-department CT or a second draw, check whether Tylenol dosing pushed ALT/AST, so a raised result isn't misread as liver damage."
Caveats
- Klaus is unpublished (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115) — persuasive, not binding. Everything else above is published.
- Coffey was depublished then republished; the Coffey v. Shiomoto citation above is the operative one.
- Hughey is 1991, decided under former VC 23157(a)(5) (now 23612(a)(5)) — the incapacity provision survives in substance, but cite the current section and check for amendment.
- Harb and D'Braunstein are negligence/civil-rights cases, not DUI prosecutions — they inform the story, they do not bind a DUI court.
- Case outcomes on a given record do not guarantee yours. Every item carries "on these facts."
- APS hearing = preponderance standard (CCP § 1094.5 substantial evidence on writ). Criminal case = beyond reasonable doubt. A DMV loss does not predetermine the criminal case — and vice versa. Mood v. Pierce and Buttimer v. Alexis show the two fora can reach opposite conclusions on the same stop.
Documents to gather THIS WEEK (hearing is 18 Nov)
1. Hospital/ER records from the wristband ID — any CT, GCS score, neuro obs, discharge dx. This is the load-bearing evidence for Hughey.
2. The booking medical screening form (Title 15 § 1207) — was one even completed?
3. Bodycam via the CPRA certified letter to SBPD Records — captures the slurred speech and the officer's advice against care.
4. Notarised affidavits from Kristine and the cousin — the cousin's "is he normally this slow?" exchange.
5. Proof of Restriction B on the licence (corrective lenses).
6. Vasquez's statement and her CPT #559 certification.
7. Storage temp log + kit #373451 records.
8. Any proof you had no access to care in the cell — supports "should have known".
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Sources: Justia / CourtListener / FindLaw / courts.ca.gov published opinions; CAP Central case summaries; CDC and Mayo Clinic concussion criteria; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 1207.
Companion file: DUI-attorney-vetting.md